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APPLICATION OF THE ADEA TO INDIAN
TRIBES: EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy
Equipment & Construction Co.,
986 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1993)
Indian tribes' in the United States, while not considered
independent sovereign nations, 2 are entitled to certain rights of
autonomy in their internal affairs.3 The autonomy of Indian
tribes is somewhat limited in that Congress retains plenary
power 4 to modify or eliminate these rights of self-government.'
Yet when a law infringes on a specific right which has been
reserved to tribal self-government, that statute will not be en-
forced against a tribe absent a clear showing of congressional
intent. 6 One law that implicates the tension between tribal rights
and congressional power is the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967 (ADEA),7 which prohibits age discrimination
in various aspects of employment.8 The ADEA is silent regarding
1. This Comment uses the term "Indian" instead of "Native American"
to be consistent with the Eighth Circuit's language in EEOC v. Fond du Lac
Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1993).
2. See infra note 20 for a brief overview of U.S./Indian relations. For a
discussion of the evolution of Indian tribes as sovereign nations in the United
States, see generally Vicki J. Limas, Employment Suits Against Indian Tribes:
Balancing Sovereign Rights and Civil Rights, 70 DENV. U. L. REv. 359, 365-
71 (1993).
3. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (ex-
plaining that tribes have an inherent power of self-government with respect
to their political integrity, economic security, health, and welfare); Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (noting that Indian tribes have
"the power of regulating their internal and social relations"); United States
v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (holding that Indian tribes have always
had inherent but limited sovereign powers).
4. Plenary powers are defined as "[a]uthority and power as broad as is
required in a given case." BLACc's LAW DICTIONARY 1154 (6th ed. 1990).
5. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56 (acknowledging that
Congress has plenary power to limit, modify, or eliminate the limited sover-
eignty of Indian tribes).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986) (holding
that congressional intent to abrogate treaty rights must be explicit).
7. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
8. Tribal employment is also governed by the Indian Civil Rights Act,
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988 & Supp. I 1990). This Act contains a variety
of constitutional rights that cannot be compromised by Indian tribes exercising
their power of self-government, including "equal protection of its laws." Id.
§ 1302(8).
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its applicability to Indian tribes, although it could potentially
infringe on tribes' rights to regulate their internal affairs.9 In
EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equipment & Construction Co., 0
the Eighth Circuit held that the ADEA does not apply to Indian
tribes because there is no clear congressional intent that the
statute should apply to Indians."
In Fond du Lac, a member of the Fond du Lac Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa tribe, Marvin Pellerin, 2 sought em-
ployment with an equipment and construction company" wholly
owned by the tribe. The employer allegedly refused to hire
Pellerin because of his age. 14 Thereafter, Pellerin filed a com-
plaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), which brought suit on his behalf against both the
construction company and the tribe itself," alleging that they
9. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act provides in relevant part:
(b) The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year: Provided, That prior to June
30, 1968, employers having fewer than fifty employees shall not
be considered employers. The term also means (1) any agent of
such a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision of a State
and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political sub-
division of a State, and any interstate agency, but such term does
not include the United States, or a corporation wholly owned by
the Government of the United States.
29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
The Tenth Circuit addressed the applicability of the ADEA to Indian tribes
in EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1989). See infra notes
47-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cherokee Nation. Courts
have also addressed the applicability of other employment-related statutes to
Indian tribes. See Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm'n, 4
F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding Indian Commission exempt from FLSA
regulation relying on comity because the statute and treaties were ambiguous).
See also Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 1989)
(holding that ERISA, as a statute of general application, does not significantly
interfere with tribal self-governance); Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm,
751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that OSHA does apply to Indian
tribes because it does not affect self-governance); Donovan v. Navajo Forest
Products Indus., 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982) (finding that OSHA does not
apply to Indian tribes).
10. 986 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1993).
11. Id.
12. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) initiated the
litigation on behalf of Pellerin. Id. at 248. The federal government officially
recognizes Pellerin's tribe. Id.
13. Fond du Lac Heavy Equipment and Construction Company was located
on the Indian reservation, but performed some jobs off the reservation. Id.
14. Id. The opinion does not specify Mr. Pellerin's exact age.
15. The Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa tribe chartered
and wholly owned the construction and equipment company. Id.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/17
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had discriminated against Pellerin on the basis of age16 in
violation of the ADEA.1 7 The United States District Court for
the District of Minnesota found that the ADEA did not apply
to Indian tribes.'8 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that the ADEA did not apply to a member of a tribe,
the tribe as an employer, or reservation employment. 19
The U.S. government has historically recognized Indian tribes
as politically distinct entities which possess inherent sovereign
powers.0 Specifically, the government has recognized that Indian
tribes possess certain inherent rights of self-government in their
internal affairs. 21 These Indian rights are created by treaties, 2
statutes, executive orders,2 and federal common law.2 4 Congress,
16. Fond du Lac, 986 F.2d at 248.
17. Id. at 247-48.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 251.
20. The United States originally recognized tribes as separate nations, as
evidenced by its dealings with tribes and by the U.S. Constitution. The
government, recognizing tribes as distinct nations, entered into various treaties
with Indian governments, beginning with a 1778 treaty with the Delaware tribe
and ending in 1871 with a statute prohibiting future treaties. See Act of Mar.
3, 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871) (creating appropriations for Indian Depart-
ment and fulfilling treaty stipulations); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515, 549 (1832) (describing Indian tribes as distinct political societies and citing
the 1778 treaty as authority). The U.S. Constitution equates Indian tribes with
foreign nations and states in defining the scope of its power to regulate
commerce. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have the power
... to regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,
and with Indian tribes."). Additionally, Indians are excluded from population
counts for representation and taxation purposes. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
2, cl. 2.
For an in-depth discussion of the evolution of Indian rights in the United
States, see FELIX S. COH-EN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 47-228(1982); VnqE DELOR A, JR. & CLIFFORD LYTLE, THE NATIONS WmN: THE
PAST AND FuTuRE OF AMERicAN INDIAN SOVEREIONTY (1984); Limas, supra
note 2; Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope,
and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. Rv. 195 (1984).
21. See supra notes 3 & 20 for a discussion of the limited sovereignty of
Indian tribes.
22. The United States signed treaties with the Indian tribes until 1871. Act
of Mar. 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871) (ending the power to make treaties
with Indian tribes). Scholars have suggested that the one hundred-year history
of such treaties is evidence that the United States saw Indian tribes as sovereign
states because treaties are agreements between two sovereign states. See Alex
Tallchief Skibine, Applicability of Federal Laws of General Application to
Indian Tribes and Reservation Indians, 25 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 85, 86 n.2
(1991); see generally 2 SENATE COMm. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, INDIAN AFFAIRS:
LAWS AND TREATIES, S. Doc. No. 452, 57th Cong., Ist Sess. (Charles J.
Kappler ed., 1903) (containing treaties between the United States and Indian
tribes through 1868).
23. Indian reservations can be created by -statute, agreement, or executive
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however, has plenary authority to limit, modify, or eliminate
these rights.21 Courts have held that general acts of Congress
apply to tribes unless Congress expressly indicated to the con-
trary.26 However, if an act would abrogate a specific right
reserved to Indian tribes, there must be an additional showing
that Congress intended the statute to apply to Indian tribes.
21
In United States v. Dion,s the Supreme Court held that when
a specific Indian right exists, a statute can abrogate that right
upon a clear showing of congressional intent 29 The Court adopted
an "actual consideration" test30 to determine whether Congress
actually considered the conflict between the Indian right and
the law.3 ' The Dion Court held that there must be a clearly
articulated intent32 to apply the statute to Indian tribes. How-
ever, the Court recognized that there is no absolute rule as to
order as well as by treaty. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 745 n.8
(1986).
24. Id. at 745.
25. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (recognizing
plenary power of Congress over Indian sovereignty). This plenary power derives
from three sources. First, treaties signed between the United States and Indian
tribes grant Congress this power. See Skibine, supra note 22, at 87 n.3.
Second, the Commerce Clause of the federal constitution allows Congress to
regulate commerce with Indian tribes. See supra note 20 for further discussion
of this aspect of thi Commerce Clause. Third, Congress claims it has a
"trustee" relationship with the tribes in which Congress is the trustee and the
tribes are the beneficiaries. See Skibine, supra note 22, at 87 n.3.
26. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99,
120 (1960) (reiterating that general congressional acts apply to Indians when
there is no clear expression otherwise). See also Reich v. Great Lakes Indian
Fish & Wildlife Comm'n, 4 F.3d 490, 493 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that there
is a cannon of construction that treaties and statutes should be construed in
favor of Indians) (citing Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759
(1985)).
27. See, e.g., Dion, 476 U.S. at 738 (requiring clear and plain congressional
intent to abrogate Indian treaty rights).
28. 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
29. The Dion Court explicitly dealt with a treaty right. However, the Court
noted that non-treaty rights carry the same implications as treaty rights. Id.
at 745 n.8.
30. Id. at 739. This test requires that in order to enforce a statute against
an Indian tribe, there must be clear evidence that Congress "actually consid-
ered" the conflict with the Indian right and then chose to abrogate the treaty
right. Skibine, supra note 22, at 93-94. In Dion, the Court held that the Eagle
Protection Act applied to the Yankton Sioux Tribe, despite the Tribe's right
under a 1858 treaty to hunt the bald or golden eagle on the Indian reservation.
Dion, 476 U.S. at 743. In so holding, the Court further concluded that, based
on the legislative history of the Act, Congress believed it was abrogating the
rights of Indians in enacting the statute. Id. at 744-45.
31. Id. at 739-40. See also Skibine, supra note 22, at 85, for a discussion
of the Dion approach and its extension.
32. 476 U.S. at 738.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/17
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what constitutes evidence of this intent.33 The Court concluded
that it is sufficient that the evidence of congressional intent to
abrogate any specific right be compelling. 34
Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
in 1967. 31 The Act prohibits an employer from discriminating
in employment decisions based on age. 36 In defining "em-
ployer," the statute neither includes or excludes Indian tribes.37
However, because application of the ADEA to Indian tribes
would infringe upon a specific Indian right of self-government, 3s
courts have used the Dion actual consideration test 9 to determine
whether Congress intended to abrogate Indian rights. 4° Courts
have looked to the language of Title VII, 41 the prototype for
the ADEA, to ascertain congressional intent. 42
Congress modeled the ADEA after Title VII in both language
and asserted purpose.43 However, while the definition of the
33. Id. at 739. The Dion Court noted that over the years they have applied
many different standards, ranging from explicit statements of intent to a study
of the legislative history. Id.
34. Id. at 739-40. The Court did not require explicit expressions of con-
gressional intent, but instead allowed any mode of "clear evidence" that
Congress considered the potential abrogation of Indian rights. Id.
35. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
36. Id.
37. See supra note 9 for the ADEA definition of employer.
38. Specifically, application of the ADEA to Indian tribes would give the
EEOC jurisdiction to investigate age discrimination complaints against Indian
tribes, businesses, and individuals, thereby infringing upon the right of Indian
tribes to regulate their own internal affairs. Fond du Lac, 986 F.2d at 249.
39. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text for further discussion of
the actual consideration test.
40. See EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 F.2d
246, 250 (8th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937, 938 (10th
Cir. 1989).
41. Title VII is part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
42. Congress, in enacting Title VII, expressly excluded age as a protected
category. See 110 CONG. REC. 2596-99 (1964) (debate over amendment to
include age on the list of protected categories). Instead, after enactment of
Title VII, the Secretary of Labor conducted an independent study on age
discrimination. This study led to enactment of the ADEA, which relied heavily
on Title VII for structural guidance. See EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d
937, 941 n.2 (10th Cir. 1989) (Tacha, J., dissenting) (explaining the enactment
of the ADEA as a result of the absence of protection against age discrimination
in Title VII). The Americans with Disabilities Act, enacted in 1990, also
expressly excludes Indian tribes from its definition of employer. ADA §
101(5)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5).
43. Title VII provides in pertinent part:
(b) The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has twenty-five or more employees for
19941 385
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word "employer" in Title VII explicitly excludes Indian tribes,4
the ADEA definition lacks a similar exclusion. 41 Courts have
struggled to determine whether this omission is evidence of
congressional intent to include or exclude Indian tribes under
ADEA coverage. 46
In EEOC v. Cherokee Nation,47 the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that the ADEA did not apply to the Cherokee
Nation 48 in an age discrimination claim. 49 The court, in applying
the Dion actual consideration test,5 0 found that explicit language
applying the statute to Indian tribes, either in the statute itself
or its legislative history, was necessary in order to find the clear
intent required by Dion.5 1 The court concluded that because
there was no such explicit language, the ADEA did not abrogate
the Cherokees' treaty right 2 of self-government." The court
declined to apply a Title VII analysis to determine the applica-
bility of the ADEA to Indian tribes. 4 Although the court
each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in
the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a
person, but such term does not include (1) the United States, a
corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States,
[or] an Indian tribe...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added). See supra note 9 for the similar
provision of the ADEA.
44. Title VII explicitly excludes Indian tribes to allow them to prefer their
members in tribal employment. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
548 (1974); Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d at 941 (Tacha, J., dissenting).
45. See supra notes 9 & 43 and accompanying text for a comparison of
the definitions of employer in Title VII and the ADEA.
46. See, e.g., EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986
F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937 (10th Cir.
1989).
47. 871 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1989).
48. The Cherokee Nation is a federally recognized Indian tribe. The
Cherokee Nation derives its right of self-government of internal affairs from
the Treaty of New Echota, 7 Stat. 478 (1835), executed between the Cherokees
and the United States. 871 F.2d at 938 n.2.
49. In Cherokee Nation, the EEOC sought to judicially enforce a subpoena
duces tecum requiring the Cherokee Nation to produce employment documents
as part of an age discrimination investigation. The complaint alleged that the
Cherokee Nation's Director of Health and Human Services discriminated
against former employees. 871 F.2d at 937.
50. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text for further discussion of
the actual consideration test.
51. 871 F.2d at 938.
52. Id. at 939. See supra note 48 for a discussion of the Cherokee Nation's
treaty right. But see Myrick v. Devils Lake Sioux Mfg. Corp., 718 F. Supp.
753, 754 (D.N.D. 1989) (holding that the ADEA applied to a tribal business
when a non-tribal employee was involved).
53. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d at 939.
54. Id.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/17
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conceded that under traditional statutory construction the
ADEA's silence on exclusion of tribes would indicate congres-
sional intent to include Indian tribes, 5 traditional rules of stat-
utory construction do not apply to cases involving the abrogation
of Indian treaty rights.5 6 Additionally, the court held that in
ambiguous situations, future courts should resolve uncertainties
in favor of tribal sovereignty.57
The dissent in Cherokee Nation found that Dion did not
require explicit language, but instead required only sufficiently
compelling evidence of congressional intent to abrogate the
Indian tribe's right." Claiming that a comparison to Title VII
is essential in determining congressional intent in drafting the
ADEA, 59 the dissent concluded that because the drafters of the
ADEA relied almost exactly on the wording of Title VII's
employer definition, the absence of the Indian exclusion indicates
a clear intent to include Indians in ADEA coverage.'
In EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equipment & Construction
Co.,61 the Eighth Circuit adopted the reasoning of Cherokee
Nation 2 in holding that the ADEA is not applicable to Indian
tribes because it does not explicitly abrogate the tribe's right of
self-government in internal affairs. 6 First, the court recognized
that when a specific right is reserved to Indians, it exists absent
a clear showing of congressional intent. 4 The court further
recognized that while treaty rights are the most common Indian
rights entitled to legislative deference, such rights also come
from statutes, executive agreements, and federal common law. 65
55. The Cherokee Nation court assumed that under normal rules of con-
struction the conspicuous absence of an Indian exclusion clause in the ADEA
indicates that Indians are included in the ADEA coverage. Id.
56. Id. See also Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)
(holding that when there is an ambiguity in a statutory provision, courts
should interpret this ambiguity in favor of Indian sovereignty); County of
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985) (holding that there
is a unique "canon[ I of construction" mandating that ambiguous statutory
provisions be construed in favor of Indian tribes).
57. 871 F.2d at 939. See also Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,
490 U.S. 163, 180 (1989) (holding that ambiguities in federal law should be
construed in favor of tribal sovereignty).
58. EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937, 940 (10th Cir. 1989) (Tacha,
I., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739-40 (1986)).
59. Id. at 941 (Tacha, J., dissenting).
60. Id. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text for further discussion
of the relationship between Title VII and the ADEA.
61. 986 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1993).
62. 871 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1989).
63. Fond du Lac, 986 F.2d at 250.
64. Id. at 248.
65. Id. See supra notes 20 & 25 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the origin of Indian rights.
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The Fond du Lac court found an implicit right of the tribe to
make its own law on substantive matters. 6
The court emphasized that the employment dispute at issue
was strictly internal, involving not only an individual tribe
member, but also a tribal employer engaged in a business located
on the reservation. 67 Because of the internal nature of the
dispute,68 the court concluded that application of the ADEA
would interfere directly with the tribe's right of self-govern-
ment.6 9 This direct interference with a specific Indian right led
the court to require a clear and plain congressional intent to
include Indians under the ADEA in order to apply the Act to
them.7"
Applying Dion,71 the majority in Fond du Lac held that in
order to prove congressional intent to subject Indians to the
ADEA, either the language of the ADEA itself or its legislative
history must refer explicitly to the effect of the statute on
Indians. 72 Because the court found no express reference to
Indians in either the statute or its legislative history, it concluded
that the ADEA does not apply to Indian tribes. 73
Lastly, the Fond du Lac court analyzed the impact of the
employer definition in Title VII74 as compared to the similar
provision in the ADEA.75 The court, although recognizing the
similarity in the two provisions, found that Dion required an
affirmative evidence of congressional intent to apply the statute
to Indian tribes. 76 Here, the court held that the Title VII
comparison did not provide the requisite clear and plain inten-
tion to apply the ADEA to Indian tribes.77
66. Id. at 249.
67. Fond du Lac, 986 F.2d at 250.
68. Id. The court noted that notions of a tribe's "culture and traditions"
should be considered in determining the internal nature of the situation. Id.
at 249. However, unlike Title VII, which by excluding Indian tribes permits
them to prefer their own members for employment in their internal govern-
ment, the Fond du Lac dissent found no reason to classify an employee's age
as a matter of internal tribal concern. Id. at 251. (Wollman, J., dissenting).
See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
69. Fon du Lac, 986 F.2d at 249.
70. Id.
71. 476 U.S. 734 (1986). See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text for
discussion of Dion and its actual consideration test.
72. EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 F.2d 246,
250 (8th Cir. 1993).
73. Id. at 251.
74. See supra note 43 for the relevant language of Title VII.
75. Fond du Lac, 986 F.2d at 250.
76. Like the Dion Court, the Eighth Circuit referred to the fact that
ambiguities should be resolved in favor of Indian tribes. Id.
77. Id. at 251.
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The dissent in Fond du Lac concluded that the ADEA should
apply to Indian tribes based on the dissent in Cherokee Nation.78
First, the Fond du Lac dissent opined that the omission of the
Indian exclusion clause in the ADEA's definition of employer
demonstrated congressional intent to include Indian tribes in the
statute's coverage. 79 Second, the dissent reasoned that, while
application of Title VII to Indian tribes potentially would threaten
the tribe's internal sovereignty, no similar concern justified
excluding Indian tribes from coverage under the ADEA.80 While
the Indian tribe exception was necessary in Title VII to allow
Indian tribes to preferentially hire tribe members, no such basis
for tribal sovereignty exists in the context of age discrimination.81
Therefore, the dissent concluded that the ADEA would not
infringe upon tribal rights of self-government and should apply
to Indian tribes. 82
The Fond du Lac majority's reasoning is faulty. While the
ADEA does not explicitly refer to Indian tribes, there is clear
evidence that Congress intended the statute to be one of general
applicability. First, the court erred in its comparison of Title
VII and the ADEA. The court failed to give sufficient weight
to the omission of the Indian exception in the ADEA employer
definition as an affirmative expression of congressional intent.83
Given that the definition of employer in both statutes is identical
except for the Indian exception, Congress clearly considered
whether or not Indians should be included under the ADEA.
Additionally, while ambiguities should generally be construed in
78. Id. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text for discussion of the
Cherokee Nation dissent.
79. 986 F.2d at 251 (Wollman, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge
Wollman relied heavily on the reasoning of the Cherokee Nation dissent.
According to both dissents, the language of Title VII compared with that of
the ADEA clearly shows that Congress intended the ADEA to apply to Indian
tribes. Judge Wollman characterized this as "the clear congressional reliance
on Title VII's provisions ... [that] evidences congressional intent on the face
of the statute to include Indian tribes in the definition of employer for the
purposes of the ADEA." Id. (quoting EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d
937, 942 (10th Cir. 1989) (Tacha, J. dissenting)). See supra notes 41-45 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the similarities between the ADEA and
Title VII.
80. 986 F.2d at 251 (Wollman, J., dissenting). For similar reasoning applied
to the FLSA, see Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm'n, 4
F.3d. 490, 499 (7th Cir. 1993) (Coffey, J., dissenting) (concluding that absent
an abrogation of a specific right, the FLSA applies to the Indian Commission
because the FLSA is a statute of general applicability).
81. 986 F.2d at 251.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 250.
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favor of Indian tribes,8 the ADEA is not ambiguous. Instead,
the ADEA clearly identifies who qualifies and who does not
qualify as an employer. Finally, EEOC regulation of age dis-
crimination does not necessarily infringe upon any specific tribal
rights of self-government."5 Therefore, as Judge Wollman stated
in the Fond du Lac dissent, application of the ADEA to Indian
tribes would not threaten tribal sovereignty to a degree greater
than would any federal law of general applicability.86
The Eighth Circuit, in holding that the ADEA does not apply
to Indian tribes, misconstrued the statute to the detriment of
victims of age discrimination. The ADEA does not pose a threat
to Indian sovereignty and should be applied to Indian tribes
acting as employees in accordance with the apparent intent of
Congress.
Lindsay A. Newbold*
84. For a discussion of rationales asserted in support of sovereign immu-
nity, see Limas, supra note 2, at 371-75.
85. The Fond du Lac Board apparently failed to identify any cultural
practices that require the tribe to favor younger members of the tribe for
employment. Fond du Lac, 986 F.2d at 251 (Wollman, J., dissenting). If there
are in fact no cultural reasons to favor young employees, this is support for
a distinction between Title VII and the ADEA. Within the context of Title
VII, it is reasonable that Indian tribes should be allowed to favor Indians for
employment, and are therefore not covered as employers under Title VII. Id.
(citing EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937, 942 (10th Cir. 1989) (Tacha,
J., dissenting)). See also supra notes 68-70. See generally Limas, supra note
2, at 389-92 (arguing that is actually in the best interest of Indian tribes as
sovereigns to protect the employment rights of their tribal employees).
86. 986 F.2d at 251.
* J.D. 1995, Washington University.
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